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Preface
Preface
Because of its national history, Germany 
bears a special responsibility towards the 
Jewish people and the state of Israel. Ever 
since the inception of the Bertelsmann 
Stiftung almost forty years ago, my husband 
and I have been committed to fostering 
reconciliation between Germans and Israelis. 
On our many visits to Israel, we have always 
been moved by the open and welcoming 
attitudes of its people, many of whom have 
become good friends of ours. Personalities 
like Shimon Peres, Teddy Kollek, and Dov 
Judkowski helped us to realize important 
projects such as developing a German-Israeli 
Young Leaders Exchange Program, fostering 
an institute for teaching democratic values, 
equality, and acceptance, and founding the 
first school of journalism in Israel.
Germany and Israel have drawn closer to-
gether in the past decades, maintaining close 
relations on all levels and across a broad 
spectrum of fields, largely thanks to the 
efforts of the generations who experienced 
the horrors of the Nazi past at first hand. 
These people understood the importance of 
working for reconciliation and paving the 
way towards a shared future. 
In both countries, however, many young peo-
ple too are keenly interested in each other 
and are committed to a future together. One 
important goal is to learn from one another, 
for without such learning, we cannot succeed 
in making our world a more equitable and 
more peaceful place.
In order to continue the serious, open dialog 
between our peoples, it is important to be 
aware of differences in perception and changes 
in the way we view each other over time. 
Israel is located in a political environment in 
which it is necessary to reflect on individual 
perspectives – which makes it all the more 
important to be aware of the hopes and fears 
of the population. The present study aims to 
contribute to this awareness. It is based on a 
recent survey in which over 2,000 people in 
Germany and Israel were interviewed about 
their personal attitudes and convictions.
Liz Mohn
Vice-chair of the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Executive Board
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The findings of this survey can help us to un-
derstand and respect each other not only in 
our similarities, but also – and perhaps espe-
cially – in our diversity. This understanding 
is of crucial importance in our globalized 
world. Additionally, discovering common 
ground is dependent on personal encounters 
and open dialog based on genuine interest 
in one another. It is familiarity that breeds 
understanding, and understanding is the 
foundation on which we can build trust and 
friendship.
82. History and Holocaust
Introduction
Introductio
May 2015 will mark the fiftieth anniversary 
of German-Israeli diplomatic relations. Dur-
ing these fifty years, the two countries have 
intensified their political and economic ties 
and drawn closer together in a wide variety 
of social spheres. They have also launched 
a number of joint projects such as coopera-
tive business and research endeavors, joint 
cultural initiatives, and numerous encounter 
programs for young people from both coun-
tries. All these efforts attest to the special 
significance of the bilateral relations bet-
ween Israel and Germany, which also shows 
in the annual consultations between the two 
governments, which began in 2008 to mark 
the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of 
the state of Israel.
As a consequence of Germany’s responsibil-
ity for the Holocaust, the country’s commit-
ment to Israel’s right to existence and to 
bearing joint responsibility for its security 
ranks among the seemingly unshakable 
cornerstones of German foreign policy. 
Leading political figures have reaffirmed 
this commitment on numerous occasions. 
However, the relationship between the two 
countries cannot by any stretch be descri-
bed as normal; it remains colored by the 
past and its fragility is evident in many of 
the controversies that have arisen in recent 
years – such as that surrounding Günter 
Grass’s poem “What must be said.” Similarly, 
the most recent escalation in the conflict 
between Israel and Hamas in the summer of 
2014 brought deep-rooted emotions to the 
surface. The war in the Middle East trig-
gered an increase in anti-Semitic activity in 
Germany that even included acts of physical 
violence against Jews. The criticism leveled 
at the Israeli government in public discourse 
was often based on anti-Semitic stereotypes, 
while the policies of the Israeli government 
were compared with those of the Nazis.
Thus it seems appropriate to examine the 
exact nature of the relationship between the 
Germans and the Jewish population of Israel. 
What do the people of each country think 
about each other, what importance do they 
place on the remembrance of Nazi crimes, 
and what do they think about German and 
Israeli policies? And finally, how have these 
perceptions and attitudes changed in recent 
years?
A clear understanding of the ways in which 
Germany and Israel perceive each other 
is crucial for the future of their bilateral 
relations, since the attitudes underlying 
these perceptions may serve as indicators 
for potential future crises and challenges 
and thus provide early warning signs for the 
benefit of those dedicated to fostering dialog 
and understanding between the two nations.
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This is the reasoning behind the Bertels-
mann Stiftung’s decision to reprise its 2007 
demoscopic study and commission a new 
survey, for which approximately 1,000 people 
over the age of 18 were interviewed in each 
of the two countries in 2013. Because of 
the nature of the inquiry, the Israeli part of 
the survey was limited to Jewish citizens. 
Most, though not all, of the questions were 
identical in both representative studies. Also 
available were the data from a 1991 survey 
commissioned by the magazine Der Spie-
gel which, like the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s 
surveys, sought to analyze and compare the 
attitudes and perceptions of Germans and 
Israelis. For some of the questions, therefore, 
comparisons over a longer time frame were 
possible.
In order to verify whether attitudes in the 
German population had changed appreci-
ably since the beginning of 2013, mainly 
due to the Gaza war in the summer of 2014, 
seven of the questions were asked again in a 
representative survey in Germany in October 
2014. The results show that many attitudes 
remain relatively stable over time. However, 
the German population had a significantly 
lower opinion of Israel in October 2014 than 
at the time of the 2013 survey and seems to 
be increasingly frustrated and perplexed by 
the issue of whether to support Israel or the 
Palestinians.
Our thanks go first of all to the authors Roby 
Nathanson and Steffen Hagemann for their 
analysis and evaluation of the survey data. 
Additionally, special thanks are also due to 
Dan Diner for his commentary and review 
of the findings. We would also like to thank 
Roland Imhoff and Stephan Stetter for their 
support in the development and evaluation 
of the questionnaire as well as TNS Emnid 
in Germany and TNS Teleseker in Israel for 
conducting the surveys.
Stephan Vopel
Director
Living Values Program
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Method
Method
The data were collected through telephone interviews, using a Computer-Assisted 
Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system, according to the following parameters: 
Similar surveys were conducted in Israel and Germany in both 1991 and 2007 
in cooperation with local partners TNS Teleseker; some of the questions were 
repeated here for tracking purposes (comparing data over time), while others were 
original. The German data were collected by TNS Emnid. Data collection in Ger-
many began with a pilot study that was used to determine the proper proportions 
of landlines and mobile phones, and then a dual-frame method was used to reach 
samples of both landlines and mobile users. 
The survey results have a 90-percent confidence rate and the margin of error is 
+/–3 percent for n = 1,000. 
With reference to the Israeli data, it should be noted that Arab citizens of Israel  
were not surveyed. The Israeli sample included in this survey was limited to 
Jewish respondents, since the results regarding the relationship between the two 
countries are directly related to ethnicity.
Country Population Sample Size Dates of Fielding
Germany 18+ 1,000 7-19/1/2013
Israel (Jews) 18+ 1,001 7-10/1/2013
11
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2. History and Holocaust
1. The state and national identity
The memory of the Holocaust has greatly 
affected the political culture of German and 
Israeli society since World War II. Narratives 
of national identity had to relate to the per-
secution of the Jewish people in one way or 
another. History therefore not only continues 
to shape self-awareness and constructions 
of collective identity, but also remains a neg-
ative reference point in bilateral relations. 
After World War II, German society experi-
enced a rupture of identity: The Holocaust 
made it difficult to identify with the nation 
in an unambiguously positive way. The con-
sciousness of complete defeat and collective 
catastrophe weakened a nationalism that 
had previously flourished. In the first decade 
after World War II, this crisis of identity was 
overcome by disregarding or even suppres-
sing the memory of the Holocaust. It was 
not until later that the commemoration of 
the persecution of the Jews gained relevance 
and importance for the German collective 
memory. Since then, criticism of any form of 
national belonging and universal values and 
norms have become constitutive factors in 
the reshaping of German identity. But at the 
same time, traditions of an ethnic under-
standing of German nationalism remain 
anchored in German political culture.
      “The memory of the  
Holocaust has greatly affected  
       the political culture of  
  German and Israeli society.”
In Israel, the history of the Holocaust consti-
tuted an important narrative of justification 
for the founding of the state in that, accor-
ding to the Zionist leadership, the destruc-
tion of Europe’s Jewry was the ultimate 
proof of the necessity of a Jewish State. This 
self-conception of Israel shapes its national 
identity to this day. Moreover, narratives of 
justification retain a high relevance in the 
Israeli discourse, since the state-building 
enterprise is an unfinished project which 
is challenged from both the inside and the 
outside. In the following chapter we will 
discuss the effects of these different political 
cultures on national identification and collec-
tive identity formation.
Nation and identity
In total, 80 percent of Germans agree with 
the statement that being German is an 
important part of their identity, but less 
than half (40 percent) of them feel strong 
agreement (see figure 1). In Israel, an over-
whelming majority of 90 percent agrees that 
being Israeli is important, with 74 percent 
having a strong national attachment.
1  The state and 
national identity
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A similar pattern emerges on the question 
of the moral superiority of the respective 
nat ion: 40 percent of Germans agree some-
what strongly with the statement that their 
coun try is very moral compared to other 
countries – far fewer than in Israel, where 
the agreement rate is 62 percent (see figure 
2). Nearly 80 percent agree that Israel is 
very moral compared to other nations, and 
nearly half completely agree (three times 
more than the Germans who completely 
agree with a similar statement about their 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Response of “1” (Fully agree) Response of “2” Response of “3” 
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Figure 1: Identiﬁcation with own country (%)
Agreement with the statement: “Being German/Israeli is an important part of my identity.”
Scale 1 (“I fully agree“)                 6 (“I absolutely disagree“). Displayed are responses 1, 2 and 3.
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Source: TNS Emnid 2013
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1. The state and national identity
Our findings reveal that 14 percent firmly 
believe that it is disloyal for Germans to  
criticize Germany (a total of half agree at 
some level), and roughly half do not agree – 
while two-thirds of Israelis view criticism  
as disloyalty. We will discuss this in more 
detail below. 
country – the total agreement is similar in 
both communities, but Germans take a much 
more qualified stance). The fact that, despite 
the Holocaust, 76 percent of Germans con-
sider Germany (to varying degrees) to be a 
very moral nation compared to other nations 
might be connected to the commemoration 
or Aufarbeitung of the Holocaust in Germany 
and the country’s resultant self-image of a 
“mature nation” that has learned the lessons 
of the past.
These data reveal a dichotomy that is typical 
of German feelings today: While the national 
and cultural identity is clearly important, it 
is considered wrong or even dangerous in 
the post-war environment to be too openly 
demonstrative about national pride for fear 
of cultivating nationalism. German national 
attachment therefore remains strong but 
more qualified than in Israel. 
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Figure 2: Attitudes towards morality of own country (%)
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Agreement with the statement: “Compared to other nations Germany/Israel is a very moral nation.”
Scale 1 (“I fully agree“)                 6 (“I absolutely disagree“). Displayed are responses 1, 2 and 3.
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
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We have seen that national pride runs high 
among the Israeli Jews sampled here. This 
has been the case in the past as well: In the 
late 1990s through the mid-2000s, when 
Jewish Israelis were asked whether they 
were proud to be Israeli, roughly 90 percent 
expressed pride (Arian, Barnea and Ben-Nun 
2004). There was a slight decline in the level 
of pride as measured by this question in 
2004, by a few percentage points, but in  
recent years Jewish Israelis have expressed 
similar levels of pride (see the time series in 
Israeli Democracy Index surveys, 2003–2012). 
Given intensifying international criticism of 
Israel’s policies and the fact that Israelis are 
increasingly aware of such external criticism, 
the current high levels of patriotism in the 
Israeli self-image may be fuelled partly by 
defensiveness and even by the fear that the 
legitimacy of Israel is in question, and in the 
face of these concerns, respondents may 
even be willing to sacrifice critical thinking 
about the country in order to protect the 
state. Certainly the strength of the senti-
ments expressed by Israeli respondents con-
trasts with the more cautious and restrained 
German sense of identity.
On the subject of national identity, we 
have already seen that two-thirds of Israeli 
respondents believe that it is disloyal for 
Israelis to criticize Israel. This contrasts with 
certain periods in Israel’s past when clear 
distinctions were drawn between acceptable 
criticism and activities hostile to the state. 
For example, the first Lebanon War in 1982 
ushered in a period in which Israelis could 
criticize state policy without accusations of 
being disloyal to the state. This era drew to a 
close somewhere in the mid-1990s, when the 
country responded with anger to a wave of 
terrorist strikes and came to view left-wing 
critique as siding with the enemy – and 
therefore as inherently hostile to the state.
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Figure 3: Attitudes towards criticism of own country (%)
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Agreement with the statement: “It is disloyal when Germans criticize Germany / when Israelis criticize Israel.”
Scale 1 (“I fully agree”)                 6 (“I absolutely disagree”). Displayed are responses 1, 2 and 3.
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
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1. The state and national identity
are capable of sharing values in any perma-
nent way has permeated Israeli political life 
from the beginning of statehood: The first 
election created a Constitutional Assembly, 
but although this body was charged with 
writing a constitution, it failed to do so. The 
Assembly transformed itself into the first 
Knesset, but Israel remains without a formal 
written constitution to this day, a marker of 
the country’s inability to reconcile its dis-
tinct and different social components.
In Germany, the social contract is somewhat 
stronger. German society is believed to con-
sist of a fairly clearly defined and unified 
people with a common cultural identity.  
Despite many challenges and upheavals at 
the level of the state, the German people 
have historically been rather clearly delin-
eated and not widely dispersed either geo-
graphically or culturally, so that they have 
had enough similar experiences to generate 
a sense of shared community. Modern Ger-
many has made strenuous efforts to hammer 
out shared social norms and values that 
break from its past – indeed, with the ex-
press objective of breaking from its past – 
and this is one of the reasons for its stronger 
sense of social solidarity.
 
At the same time, as will be discussed in 
greater detail below, 58 percent of Germans 
consider strong growth among the country’s 
cultural or religious minorities to be menac-
ing to some degree. The positive self-image 
of Germans seems to be increasingly chal-
lenged by the growing ethnic, cultural, and 
religious diversity in Germany. In debates 
about how to redefine German identity, such 
as the Leitkultur (leading culture) discussion, 
“Modern Germany’s express 
    objective of breaking 
  from its past is one of the reasons 
for its sense of social  
solidarity.”
More than twice as many Israelis say they 
“fully agree” that criticism is disloyal as 
among the German sample, and precisely 
twice as many agree as disagree. The reason 
for this discrepancy is probably that, in Ger-
many, there are clearer definitions of citizen-
ship and of what it means to be German. The 
clearly demarcated lines of belonging in the 
German polity make society less defensive 
about the state, since criticism does not ap-
pear to threaten the identity of the country.
 
This is not yet the case in Israel, which has 
yet to define conclusively who belongs and 
does not belong to the body politic.
There is very little demographic variation in 
these feelings, save for one: Secular people 
are less likely to believe criticism is disloyal. 
Just over half (58 percent) of non-religious 
Israelis hold this view, while religious people 
are significantly more likely to do so – three-
quarters of religious Israelis regard criticism 
as disloyal. The attitudes of respondents who 
describe themselves as traditional are closer 
to religious people’s: 70 percent view such 
self-criticism as disloyal.
Shared society, lessons from the 
past, and the Other
While a majority of Israelis believe that their 
society shares clear attitudes, traditions and 
values, a lower proportion of Israelis than 
Germans holds this belief (74 percent com-
pared to 82 percent, figure 4), and nearly half 
(43 percent) give only cautious agreement. 
In light of class differences and the deep divi-
sions in Israeli society between Jewish and 
Arab, religious and secular, immigrant and 
“veteran” people, it is not surprising that Israe-
lis lack confidence in a collective identity. In 
fact, the uncertainty about whether Israelis 
“In Germany, criticism does not 
     appear to threaten the identity 
         of the country.”
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In the Israeli context, Jews would primari-
ly associate the concept of the Other with 
Arabs. Social surveys have repeatedly shown 
that Israelis view the Jewish-Arab divide as 
the deepest division in Israeli society, and 
if anything the perception of Jewish-Arab 
relations may have deepened over the last 
decade. Among young people, for example, 
a study conducted in 1998 showed that 
the top-ranked social schism was between 
religious and secular, but in two subsequent 
tracking surveys from 2004 onward, the 
Jewish-Arab divide was ranked highest 
(Hexel and Nathanson 2010). In consider-
ing Israeli attitudes towards the Other, it 
“Social surveys have  
                    repeatedly shown that  
     Israelis view the Jewish-Arab  
divide as the deepest division  
                    in Israeli society.”
Muslim immigrants have increasingly as-
sumed the function of the Other: Survey data 
show that Germans tend to hold negative 
attitudes towards Muslims, with only about a 
third reporting “positive feelings” (Pollack et 
al. 2010). In the public discourse, proponents 
of cultural nationalism define the German 
nation in a way that excludes Muslim immi-
grants from in-group membership. Although 
the adherents of a more liberal, inclusive 
approach to German national identity based 
on egalitarianism, tolerance, and the pro-
tection of minorities do extend the promise 
of membership to Muslim immigrants, even 
liberal nationalism demands that immigrants 
become culturally assimilated to some de-
gree. For example, some federal states have 
laws that forbid public school teachers from 
wearing the Muslim headscarf, and foreign 
nationals seeking German citizenship are 
required to take a naturalization test.
Figure 4: Persistence of national character (%)
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Agreement with the statement: “You will always be able to describe Germans/Israelis on the basis of certain traditions and beliefs.” 
Scale 1 (“I fully agree”)                 6 (“I absolutely disagree”). Displayed are responses 1, 2 and 3.
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1. The state and national identity
These differences between Germany and  
Israel can be explained by the lessons of 
World War II and by the historical and politi-
cal contexts of both countries. The Holocaust 
is regarded by Germans as an event which 
negatively constitutes their national identity, 
which underwent highly contested, ambiva-
lent and contradictory processes of transfor-
mation in order to replace old traditions and 
collectivist ideologies with universalistic  
values and norms. The survey shows that 
this universalism, understood as a lesson of 
World War II and the Holocaust, has become 
a constitutive factor in German national  
identity: 89 percent of Germans affirm the 
absolute primacy of individual rights which 
should not be limited under any circumstan-
ces, while 80 percent agree that the legal 
protection of ethnic and religious minorities 
is one of the most pressing tasks in society. 
Both individual rights and the protection of 
is worth noting that the Arab community 
in Israel is itself diverse even when viewed 
from the perspective of Israeli Jews. Druze 
Arabs and some Bedouins, for example, even 
serve in the Israeli army, but they are still 
commonly lumped together as an out-group. 
Therefore, the findings indicate that when 
Israeli Jews ask themselves how Arabs think 
and feel, they probably rely on one-dimen-
sional, negative cultural stereotypes. Since 
Arab citizens are obviously associated with 
the community viewed as the enemy (the 
Palestinians), the respondents also are less 
enthusiastic than Germans about advancing 
legal protections for “ethnic and religious 
minorities” (a term which most Israelis will 
associate with Arabs) as a pressing need. 
Two-thirds support this statement, but this 
is significantly fewer than among German 
respondents (80 percent; see figure 5). 
Figure 5: Lessons from history: Attitudes and values (%)
In a democracy, the rights 
of the individual should not 
be limited under any 
circumstances
The legal protection of 
ethnic and religious 
minorities is one of the most 
pressing tasks in our society 
I consider it menacing 
when cultural or religious 
minorities in my own country 
increase signiﬁcantly
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Agreement with the above statements. 
Response of “1” (Fully agree)
Israel Germany
Response of “2” 
Response of “3” 
Response of “1” (Fully agree)
Response of “2” 
Response of “3” 
Scale 1 (“I fully agree”)                 6 (“I absolutely disagree”). Displayed are responses 1, 2 and 3.
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
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percent compared to 48 percent). Further, 
not all groups are equally convinced that 
personal rights trump all: Just over half of 
religious respondents in Israel (54 percent) 
agree compared to two-thirds of non-reli-
gious respondents. Those with lower levels of 
education are evenly divided.
 
   “Germany does not have  
  the same sense of  
      uncertainty and  
    impermanence about its existence.“
These figures substantiate the fact that 
Germany and Israeli have very different ex-
periences of the present, and this is reflected 
in their attitudes towards national identity 
and democratic values. Israel is living with 
the constant possibility of attack and defeat 
on both the military and the political front. 
Germany, with all its internal complexities 
related to identity, including the question of 
minority rights and inclusion in society, does 
not have the same sense of uncertainty and 
impermanence about its existence (this is es-
pecially true after the fall of the Berlin Wall). 
In the case of Israel, in contrast, the deep 
underlying threat creates an impediment to 
fully embracing liberal democratic values 
even though the majority of the population 
would prefer to do so.
minorities can be considered shared values. 
But, unlike in Israel, these liberal commit-
ments have hardly been put to the test in 
Germany, which has a physically safe geo-
graphical location within Europe and a more 
homogeneous population than that of Israel, 
where a national minority accounts for more 
than a fifth of the population. The fear of 
growing ethnic and religious minorities in 
Germany among 58 percent of the popula-
tion is a warning sign that, in times of crisis, 
liberal values cannot be taken for granted.
 
Israelis do share the commitment to demo-
cratic principles, but in a more qualified way 
which reflects their different post-war experi-
ences and the country’s intractable conflicts. 
Nearly twice as many Israelis agree than 
disagree that individual freedoms should 
never be limited. However, there is much 
less agreement with that statement among 
Israelis than among Germans, who display 
a far greater commitment to freedom of the 
individual. The response to this question 
highlights the self-perception among Israelis 
that they embrace democratic norms; yet 
the open acknowledgment of over one-third 
that they disagree with an injunction against 
limiting individual rights quite certainly 
reflects the basic understanding, shared by 
many Israelis, that the constant danger to 
Israel’s security – which, in the eyes of Isra-
elis, threatens the country’s very existence 
– warrants the overriding of personal rights. 
This is a stark contrast to Germany, which, 
as noted above, does not perceive itself to 
be under existential and security threats, so 
that respondents here see no need to over-
ride individual rights. In Israel, those who 
agree fully with this principle do so far less 
strongly than their German counterparts (26 
“Unlike in Israel,  
     liberal commitments  
   have hardly been put to the  
              test in Germany.“
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2. History and the Holocaust
Commemorating the past is closely related 
to the construction and legitimization of 
national identities. Thus the interpretation 
of the past is always influenced by the needs 
of the present and by changing historical 
and societal conditions. In this sense, the 
Holocaust and National Socialism remain 
highly relevant and continue to influence 
self-perception, national narratives and the 
perception of the Other, albeit in dynamic 
and contested processes.
 
The following chapter will discuss the ways 
in which Germans and Israelis relate to the 
Holocaust cognitively and emotionally. As we 
saw in the preceding chapter, the two socie-
ties have some characteristics in common, 
but each also has its own understanding and 
perceptions of the present-day relevance 
of history in general and the Holocaust in 
particular. 
“Each society has its own  
       understanding and  
  perceptions  
          of the present-day  
   relevance of history.“
Continued relevance of the 
Holocaust or call for closure?
After 1945, it was no longer politically feasi-
ble to promote an unambiguously positive 
national identity in Germany. The Holocaust 
acted as a negative reference point for any 
reconstruction of collective narratives and 
identifications. With generational change 
and the passage of almost 70 years now 
causing the events of World War II to recede 
in the public memory, there is little question 
that Germans desire to move away from their 
past. A large majority of 77 percent agrees 
in a general sense that it is time to leave the 
past behind and to focus on the problems of 
the present and future.
A slightly higher proportion of respondents 
supports this in the specific case of the 
history of German persecution of the Jews, 
as figure 7 shows: 81 percent of the German 
sample prefer to put the history of the Holo-
caust behind them, and 37 percent support 
that statement strongly. Even though this 
group is smaller than the combined groups 
whose approval is more qualified, a majority 
of Germans is in favour of explicit closure 
and no longer wishes to talk so much about 
the persecution of Jews.
the Holocaust
21
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Figure 6: Leaving the past behind (%)
Agreement with the statement: “We should put the history behind us and focus more on current or future problems.” 
Response of “1” (Fully agree) Response of “2” Response of “3” 
Response of “4” Response of “5” Response of “6”
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Scale 1 (“I fully agree”)                 6 (“I absolutely disagree”). Displayed are responses 1, 2 and 3 
as agreement and responses 4, 5 and 6 as disagreement. 
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
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2. History and the Holocaust
move away from the focus on the history of 
Jewish persecution is rising steadily: from 
one-fifth (20 percent) in 1991 who disagreed 
with the statement above, to just over one-
third (37 percent) in 2007, to nearly half  
(42 percent) in the most recent survey, 
which dates from 2013.
The survey reveals a significant ageing effect 
which could not yet be discerned in 2007. 
Whereas 67 percent of the younger respon-
dents below age 40 are in favor of closure, 
only 51 percent of the older respondents 
agree with that position. The call for closure 
is supported by the majority of the genera-
tion born after 1970, whose parents were 
often not directly involved in the crimes of 
the National Socialist regime. The growing 
historical distance seems to correlate with 
In Germany the persecution of Jews is 
viewed as a dark chapter in German history, 
but not as an essential part of its identity; 
quite the opposite. Germans would prefer 
to view it as an anomaly. While there is no 
desire to deny history, the German public is 
clearly committed to cultivating a positive 
German identity based on other aspects of 
its culture, not this particular ignominious 
chapter of its past.
As a matter of fact, figure 8 shows that more 
than half (55 percent) agree with the state-
ment that “Today, almost 70 years after the 
end of World War II, we should no longer talk 
so much about the persecution of the Jews, 
but finally put the past behind us.” However, 
over the last two decades, the percentage 
of Germans who disagree with the need to 
Figure 7: Focus on current problems (%)
Agreement with the statement: “We should focus on current problems rather than on the crimes committed by the Germans against the 
Jews more than 60 years ago.” Not included: “Don't know, no response.” 
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a desire to reconstruct a more positive and 
future-oriented national identity, a develop-
ment which indicates an important challenge 
for collective memory in Germany as the 
history of the Holocaust becomes more and 
more disconnected from familial experiences 
and oral histories.
Moreover, emotions run high on this topic, 
especially among the younger generation. 
Many Germans feel angry that they are still 
being blamed for the crimes of Germany 
against the Jews: 66 percent agree with a 
statement to this effect, while one-third dis-
agree. The younger the respondents, the 
more likely they are to feel outright anger: 
Almost 80 percent of the youngest age group 
(18–29) are angry, compared to 58 percent  
of the oldest (60 and over), which still consti-
tutes a strong majority. Among the younger 
respondents in this survey, there seems to  
be a yearning for “being German” to be re-
garded as something “normal” (see figure 9).
Israeli respondents, unlike Germans, have 
remained fairly consistent over time in their 
attitudes towards history. The sample is 
divided regarding history in a general sense, 
but there is a clear and strong majority in 
favor of active remembrance of the Holo-
caust. The statement that it is not necessary 
to talk so much about the persecution of Jews 
anymore, but to think more about the future 
instead, is considered wrong by fully 77 
percent of Israeli respondents. The portion 
of Jewish Israelis who disagree that 70 years 
after World War II the persecution of the 
Jews should be consigned to the past has 
even risen by a few percentage points since 
1991 (74 percent) (see figure 8).
Referring to a related question, whether it 
is time to leave the past behind in general 
and concentrate on contemporary and future 
issues, a small majority of 54 percent agrees 
(including one-quarter who fully agree), and 
almost half the respondents (45 percent) 
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Figure 8: “Putting the past behind us” (%)
Question: “Today, almost 70 years after the end of the Second World War, we should no longer talk so much about the persecution of 
the Jews, but ﬁnally put the past behind us. Do you think this statement is right or wrong?” Not included: “Don’t know, no response.”
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these dynamics through their incendiary 
rhetoric against Israel. Iran under former 
President Ahmadinejad provided ample  
fodder by reiterating the goal of destroying 
Israel; this rhetoric was exploited and  
emphasized constantly by Israeli Prime  
Minister Netanyahu to drive home the fear  
of existential threats.
Still, the majority prefers to leave the past 
behind. Since this was asked in a general 
part of the survey, respondents may have 
interpreted the question fairly broadly. For 
many, “the past” probably means the perse-
cutions of the 20th century and the accompa-
nying stereotype of the weak and victimized 
European Jew.
disagree. Those who disagree with the need 
to leave history in general behind probably 
reflect the strong majority in the question 
about the need to remember the events of 
World War II (see figure 6).
In general, there is a strong emphasis in  
Israeli society on the 20th-century persecu-
tion of the Jews that preceded and contributed 
to the founding of the Jewish state, which is 
viewed as a historical inevitability, and the 
state is deemed the only possible means of 
guaranteeing survival. This was one of the 
primary findings of a survey by Nathanson 
and Tzameret (2000). Furthermore, in Israel 
today, modern threats against Israel, such as 
Iran or the enmity with the Palestinians, are 
commonly conflated with or at least viewed 
as a historical continuation of the anti-Semitic 
persecutions not only of the 19th and 20th 
centuries, but of earlier periods as well. Both 
Iran and the Palestinians have contributed to 
Figure 9: Anger that crimes against Jews are still held 
against Germans (%)
              a) Total                  b) By age group
Agreement with the statement: “It makes me angry when the crimes committed against Jews are still held against Germans today.” 
Respondents ranked their opinion as “I fully agree,” “I tend to agree,” “I tend not to agree” or “I absolutely disagree.” 
The question was not posed in Israel. 
Displayed are ﬁgures for “I fully agree” + “I tend to agree”
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In the early years of its statehood, Israel con-
sciously sought to leave this image behind in 
order to cultivate a national identity based on 
the archetype of a strong, assertive, and pow-
erful Israeli Jew. On the other hand, the pre-
ceding questions about Israelis who criticize 
the country and the rights of minorities and 
their growing presence in society may have 
caused some respondents to call to mind 
the current conflict and its ramifications. If 
respondents were thinking of the narrative  
of Palestinian suffering at the hands of 
Jews, including the events surrounding the 
founding of the state, some may have stated 
a preference for leaving the past behind in 
order to avoid addressing these issues.
Historical representations of the 
Holocaust
The desire for closure and the willingness to 
leave the past behind might also be related 
to different explanations of the Holocaust 
among German and Israeli respondents. 
“In the early years of its statehood,  
          Israel consciously sought to  
   cultivate a national  
        identity based on the  
     archetype of a strong,  
  assertive, and powerful  
                                 Israeli Jew.”
If the Nazi era is considered an anomaly  
and a phenomenon unconnected with a  
specific “German character,” it becomes  
easier to develop a positive national identity. 
It is therefore no surprise that German  
respondents identified external factors as  
the main driving force behind the rise of the 
Nazis: 61 percent believe that poor economic 
conditions and high unemployment helped 
National Socialism come to power. In con-
trast, the top reason given by Israelis was  
a character trait of the Germans, namely 
their tendency to follow orders. Over half,  
54 percent, view the “German character”  
as a reason (twice as many as the German  
respondents who agree with this). Despite 
these differences, it is quite surprising that 
respondents from both countries gave rather 
similar answers concerning the German ten-
dency to follow orders, their fear of Nazi ter-
ror, and the economic crisis as contributing 
factors. Israelis and Germans agree that both 
external circumstances and the obedience  
to authority of many Germans caused the 
Holocaust (see figure 10).
Regret, guilt, responsibility?  
Memory and emotions
Commemorating the past is not only a cogni-
tive process, but also an emotional one. 
“Memory evokes  
      emotions, which should
    not be construed as individual  
but as group-based  
                and social.”
 
“If the Nazi era is considered  
     an anomaly and a phenomenon  
 unconnected with  
   the ‘German character,’  
   it becomes easier to develop a 
positive national identity.”
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Memory evokes emotions, which should not 
be construed as individual but as group-
based and social. Emotions can be felt as  
part of a group, such as shame or pride for 
actions committed by other members of the 
group, while society simultaneously provides 
its members with guidelines for what to feel. 
Moreover, emotional intensity indicates the 
salience and relevance of a topic for indi-
viduals and groups. It is therefore of prime 
importance to assess the nature and 
intensity of the emotions which the com-
memoration of the persecution of the Jews 
elicits among Germans and Israelis.
Of particular interest are the uncanny 
similarities between German and Israeli 
feelings about the Holocaust at the present 
time. In both countries, roughly 90 percent 
feel regret and over 80 percent are outraged; 
half of the Jews and 60 percent of Germans 
feel shame, while half of each group feel fear. 
Perhaps most remarkably, similar numbers 
of Germans and Israelis – just over one-third 
in each case – feel guilty and almost the 
same number – 56 percent and 55 percent 
among Germans and Israelis, respectively – 
feel responsible (see figure 11). 
The data about guilt indicate that a majority 
of Germans – the two-thirds who did not 
say they feel “guilty” – feel removed enough 
from the war generation to move beyond 
personal guilt, while the fact that over half 
the German respondents (56 percent) feel re-
sponsible shows that responsibility is a more 
widely acknowledged theme than personal 
guilt. With the growing historical distance, 
it seems that less intensive emotions and 
feelings such as responsibility and regret in-
crease (though 83 percent also feel outrage). 
However, 39 percent declare that they feel 
indifferent to the persecution of Jews under 
Hitler.
“The Germans’ blind 
trust in authorities”
67
53
Israel Germany
Question: “What were the causes of National Socialism and the Holocaust in Germany? Please use a scale of 1 to 5 when rating each of 
the following answers. The cause was…?” Scale: 1 (“I fully agree”) to 5 (“I absolutely disagree”). Depicted responses: “1” + “2.” 
Figure 10: Presumed causes of National Socialism and the Holocaust (%)
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Among Israelis, the one-third who express 
guilt most likely indicates a feeling that 
the Jews themselves did not take action to 
protect themselves sufficiently or in time. 
Most likely, this feeling is accompanied by 
the sense that the state of Israel provides 
the framework for Jews to meet any such 
threat swiftly and powerfully in the future 
or to pre-empt it. In the latter context, it is 
notable that half of the Israeli sample says 
that for them, the Holocaust raises feelings 
of vengeance – but given the prevalence of 
Question: “When you think of the persecution of Jews under Hitler, how strongly do you experience the following emotions …”
Figure 11: Emotions when respondents think of the persecution 
of the Jews (%)
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relatively healthy attitudes towards Germany 
(as will be seen below), it is not clear who 
would be the target of any active feelings of 
vengeance.
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3. Israeli-German relations today
History shapes not only the self-awareness 
and collective identity of Germans and 
Israelis and the way they define otherness, 
but also bilateral relations. Bilateral relations 
remain marked by the trauma of the Holo-
caust and are therefore perceived as special 
– despite growing indifference and calls for 
the normalization of relations.
 
Israelis are aware that the history of the  
Holocaust colors their views today – over 
three-quarters say that this history has 
a negative impact on their feelings about 
contemporary Germany. However, negative 
feelings linked to the past do not sour rela-
tions with the modern state of Germany and 
at present manifest themselves mainly in  
the form of indifference: Only 16 percent  
say that they express much interest in 
Germany today, and this figure is almost 
identical to that of 2007 (see figure 12). 
    “Bilateral relations  
 remain marked and are therefore  
         perceived as special despite  
     growing indifference and  
      calls for the normalization 
                 of relations.”
Yet, it needs to be borne in mind that an  
interest in finding out more about what  
is happening in other countries is always 
linked to the turn of current events. This  
fact may help to explain the high proportions 
(31 percent) which were registered in 1991 
among the population of Israel with regard  
to interest in information about Germany.  
At the time the arson attacks against immi-
grants and refugees became a source of  
concern through out the world, and for this 
reason the Israeli desire for information 
about what was happening in Germany briefly 
shot up. Thus it does not come as a surprise 
that the current interest in information about 
Germany is at a much lower level than in 1991.
Germans tend to underestimate the enduring 
influence of the Holocaust on the perception 
and image of Germany among Jewish Israe-
lis: 43 percent of German respondents think 
that the past hardly constitutes a burden 
to present relations compared to only 21 
percent in Israel (see figure 13).
3  Israeli-German rel tions 
today
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Figure 12: Interest in information about the other country (%)
Question: “How would you describe your level of interest in information about present-day Germany/Israel. Very strong, strong, moderate, 
weak, none at all?” Not included: “Don’t know, no response.” This question was not posed in Germany in 1991.
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German respondents in this survey are  
divided equally between favorable and  
unfavorable views of Israel: 46 percent vs.  
42 percent. Very few – only 4 percent – say 
that their view is strongly favorable, while 
twice as many express strong negative feel-
ings. By contrast, Israelis feel notably more 
positive about Germans: 12 percent express 
strongly positive feelings about Germany – 
three times as many as the Germans who 
feel this way about Israel. However, there has 
been some improvement in attitudes towards 
Israel compared to 2007 (see figure 14).
Interest in and perception of  
the Other
Despite the fact that some predominantly 
young, secular Israelis are relocating to 
the German capital, and despite a modest 
increase of interest in the Other, the majority 
of Israelis have only a lukewarm interest or 
no interest at all in present-day Germany. 
Germans seem to be more interested in 
Israel, with nearly a quarter expressing very 
strong or strong interest. This disparity can 
probably be explained (at least partly) by 
the disproportionate media coverage of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict leading to high 
awareness of current events among the Ger-
man public. Moreover, interest in informa-
tion about the Other should not be confused 
with a positive attitude towards the Other.
Figure 13: Inﬂuence of the persecution of the Jews on Israeli attitudes 
towards Germans (%)
Question: “Does the persecution of the Jews under Hitler still affect the attitude of the Israelis towards the Germans? Is its inﬂuence very 
strong, fairly strong, somewhat present, or is there no inﬂuence at all?” Not included: “Don't know, no response.”
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Although Jewish Israelis express strong 
feelings about keeping alive the memory 
of the Holocaust and the ongoing sense of 
Jewish persecution today, it is notable that 
these feelings are in some ways disconnected 
from actual relations with Germany today. A 
strong 68 percent majority of Jewish Israelis 
expresses positive feelings about Germany 
overall (although a large majority of these 
respondents gives a moderate response of 
“fairly good”).
 
Notably, a larger proportion of Israeli Jews 
views Germany favorably today than in  
2007 (57 percent) and 1991 (48 percent, see 
figure 14). Similarly, 63 percent of Israelis 
also feel positive about the government of 
   “A strong majority of Jewish  
        Israelis expresses positive  
    feelings about Germany overall.“
Germany (see figure 15). In the case of both 
questions, the data show that more highly 
educated Israelis are somewhat more likely 
to have a favorable opinion of Germany: 
Almost three-quarters of Israelis with the 
highest levels of education have a positive 
opinion, compared to 59 percent of those 
with the lowest educational levels. Similar 
discrepancies emerge in assessments of the 
German government – slightly less than 
half of Israelis with the lowest educational 
levels have a favorable opinion compared to 
two-thirds of those with the highest levels of 
education.
The negative images arising from the past 
contrast with these favorable perceptions 
of modern political relations. Yet this is not 
necessarily a contradiction, since it indicates 
that the interpretations of Nazism and the 
Holocaust relate mainly to the Germany of 
the past rather than to the contemporary 
state. We cannot say whether Israelis still 
46
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Figure 14: Opinions about the other country (%)
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Further, the demographic variations imply 
that the narrative of right-leaning demo-
graphic groups emphasizes Germany’s his-
torical role in perpetrating crimes against 
Jews – most likely as a means of justifying 
the Israeli national narrative – which may  
indicate that Germany is still perceived as 
anti-Semitic or as a threat to the Jewish  
people today. The trend is confirmed by the 
youth survey from 2010, which showed that 
over time, secular young people are less and 
less likely to believe that a Nazi regime could 
arise in Germany today, while roughly half 
the religious youth and fully 60 percent of 
the ultra-orthodox believe that it could (Hexel 
and Nathanson 2010:  29). This is problematic 
because the younger generation contains  
a higher and growing portion of religious,  
ultra-orthodox, and largely right-leaning  
people, which indicates a possible trend in 
the attitudes of future generations.
 
It is, however, worth noting that almost two-
thirds of all the Jews in the youth sample do 
not agree with a statement that Germany is 
the same as it was during the war and that 
a Nazi regime could arise there again (Hexel 
and Nathanson 2010: 103).
Germans take a measured approach that 
distinguishes clearly between the policies of 
the state of Israel and the Jewish people – at 
least in theory and in rhetoric: 46 percent of 
Germans have a rather good or very good  
view of Israel in general (see figure 14), 
whereas 62 percent have a fairly poor or very 
poor opinion about the government of Israel 
(see figure 15). The findings in figure 18 
indicate a serious basis of criticism and 
outright hostility towards Israeli policy at 
“The younger generation  
      in Israel contains a higher and  
  growing portion of religious, 
      ultra-orthodox, and largely  
 right-leaning people.”
believe the negative stereotypes of the 
German character to which they attribute the 
Holocaust, but if the negative feelings have 
any effect at all, they merely weaken rather 
than actually damage the positive feelings 
evoked by the strong political relations 
between the two countries. In general, the 
mainstream Israeli narrative tends to paint 
foreign relations in broad strokes: The USA 
is understood to be for Israel, Europe is 
understood to be against it, and Germany is 
generally viewed as a stalwart ally and thus 
the exception to the European rule.
 
At the same time, there is a notable differ-
ence in attitudes towards Germany and the 
German government among younger and 
religious respondents – a profile that is typi-
cally associated with right-leaning, hard-line 
attitudes. Younger and religious respondents 
consistently view both Germany and the 
government more negatively by a significant 
margin.
Among respondents up to 29 years old,  
53 percent view Germany favorably – the 
lowest percentage of all the age groups, and 
a definite contrast to the more than 80 per-
cent of respondents aged 60 and up who take 
a favorable view of Germany. The figures  
are much more extreme among religious  
respondents, only 37 percent of whom har-
bor favorable feelings towards Germany, com-
pared to fully 84 percent of secular Israelis 
(among those who consider themselves  
“traditional,” two-thirds are favourable). The 
situation is almost identical with regard to 
attitudes towards the German government 
among these population groups.
“The USA is understood to be for Israel, 
Europe is understood to be against it, 
       and Germany is generally viewed 
                  as a stalwart ally and thus 
      the exception to the European rule.”
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present, with almost half the respondents 
comparing Israeli policy towards the 
Palestinians with the behavior of the Nazis 
towards Jews. Despite attempts to distinguish 
between people and government, the data 
indicate that the harsh criticism of the Israeli 
government also affects the perception of  
the Other in general, which would explain 
the less favorable views of Germans about 
Israel. 
All in all, the findings indicate a degree 
of disconnect between the way in which 
       “The findings indicate a  
         degree of disconnect  
 between the way in which Germany  
       and Israeli-German relations  
    are perceived by Israelis and the  
  way Israel is perceived by Germans.”
Germany and Israeli-German relations are 
perceived by Israelis and the way Israel is 
perceived by Germans. Among five major 
countries who were polled about Israel in a 
2013 Pew Global Attitudes survey, German 
respondents gave the highest “unfavourable” 
rating (62 percent) compared to the US, Rus-
sia, France and Britain. While the present 
survey shows a more even division, it is clear 
that Germans are not as positive about Israel 
as Israelis are about Germany. Israelis may 
in fact take German political support for 
granted without understanding the shifting 
public environment and zeitgeist in Germany 
today.
Anti-Semitism today
The Gaza war in 2014 has again borne out 
the observation that criticism of the govern-
ment of Israel and its policies can turn into 
criticism of Jews as a collective, thereby 
crossing the boundary between legitimate 
Figure 15: Opinions about the other country’s government (%)
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Question: “In general, what do you think about the German/Israeli government? Do you have a very good, fairly good, fairly poor, or very 
poor opinion of the German/Israeli government today?” Not included: “Don’t know, no response.”
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the communication of traditional forms of 
anti-Semitism and religious anti-Judaism as 
taboo. The concept of communicative latency 
assumes that pressure applied by political 
and societal elites has led to a situation 
where anti-Semitic sentiments are publicly 
sanctioned and therefore not communicated 
in public.
 
Nevertheless, traditional anti-Semitism 
continues to exist in latent form and comes 
to the surface from time to time. The pre-
dominant form of this kind of anti-Semitism 
in the present is the assumption of a Jewish 
conspiracy, i.e. that the Jews are in control of 
what is happening in the world. The survey 
“Traditional anti-Semitism  
   continues to exist in latent form  
 and comes to the surface 
                     from time to time.”
criticism and anti-Semitism. The survey 
therefore also included questions on dif-
ferent expressions of anti-Semitism.
The general attitude towards Jews in Germany 
is assessed quite differently in Germany than 
in Israel. Germans have a rather posi tive 
self-perception: A large majority of 77 per-
cent believes that few or no Germans have 
negative attitudes towards Jews. The data 
from the Israeli sample reveal skepticism  
regarding this assessment. While a slight 
majority assumes that most Germans today 
do not have negative feelings about Jews  
(49 percent saying either “a small number” 
or “hardly any”), 41 percent still suspect that 
many or most Germans continue to harbor 
negative attitudes. This skepticism is shared 
by 19 percent of German respondents.
The more positive assessment by German 
respondents can be related to Germany’s 
post-war political culture, which treated 
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Figure 16: Assessment of anti-Semitism in Germany (%)
Question: “How do you view the general attitude of Germans towards Jews? Do most, a large number, a small number, or hardly any have 
a negative attitude towards Jews?” Not included: “Don't know, no response.”
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the communication of traditional forms of 
anti-Semitism and religious anti-Judaism as 
taboo. The concept of communicative latency 
assumes that pressure applied by political 
and societal elites has led to a situation 
where anti-Semitic sentiments are publicly 
sanctioned and therefore not communicated 
in public.
 
Nevertheless, traditional anti-Semitism 
continues to exist in latent form and comes 
to the surface from time to time. The pre-
dominant form of this kind of anti-Semitism 
in the present is the assumption of a Jewish 
conspiracy, i.e. that the Jews are in control of 
what is happening in the world. The survey 
“Traditional anti-Semitism  
   continues to exist in latent form  
 and comes to the surface 
                     from time to time.”
reveals that over one-quarter of German 
respondents (28 percent) agree with the 
statement that Jews have too much power 
in the world. This is an alarmingly high num-
ber compared to other surveys, where only 
between 11.6 percent (Decker, Kiess and 
Brähler 2014)  and 16.4 percent (Heitmeyer 
2010) of the respondents affirmed this  
stereotype (see figure 17).
There is also another distinct form of anti- 
Semitism that has high social relevance in 
Germany. Secondary anti-Semitism can be 
viewed as a reaction to the Holocaust that 
manifests itself in the relativization, minimi-
zation or denial of guilt, the accusation that 
Jews exploit German guilt over the Holocaust, 
and the reversal of the roles of victim and 
perpetrator. Moreover, secon dary anti-Semi-
tism has in recent years been increasingly 
focused on the state of Israel, whose policies 
provide an opportunity for perpetrator-victim 
denial. By comparing Israeli policies with  
the crimes perpetrated against the Jews, 
their post-Holocaust status as victims is 
questioned and German guilt and responsi-
bility is minimized or even denied entirely: 
41 percent of German respondents view  
Israel’s policy towards the Palestinians as 
practically the same as the Nazi treatment  
of the Jews. These findings show a steep in-
crease from 30 percent in 2007 (see figure 18).
Figure 17: Anti-Semitism in Germany (%)
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Agreement with the statements: “Jews have too much inﬂuence in the world,” “I ﬁnd the Jews increasingly less likeable because of 
Israel’s policies,” “What the state of Israel is doing to the Palestinians today is essentially the same thing as what the Nazis did to the 
Jews in the Third Reich.” Not included: “Don’t know, no response.”
I fully agree I tend to agree
I tend not to agree I absolutely disagree
8
20
27
39
8
20
35
34
13
28
33
18
“Jews have too much 
inﬂuence in the world”
“Comparison of Israel’s 
Palestinian policies 
with Nazi crimes”
“Jews are less likeable 
because of Israel’s policies”
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
36
3. Israeli-German relations today
The data reveal a generational shift. The 
oldest respondents in the survey (60 years 
and older) show higher rates of agreement 
with two negative statements: Almost four 
in ten (38 percent) admit to believing that 
Jews have too much influence in the world 
(compared to one-quarter of the youngest 
respondents), and the same number (38 
percent) say they find Jews less sympathetic 
because of Israel’s policies, compared to just 
15 percent of the youngest respondents (see 
figure 19). However, anti-Semitism focusing 
on the state of Israel appears relatively even-
ly distributed among all age groups.
Additionally, criticism of Israel becomes 
problematic when Jews are assigned collec-
tive responsibility and when the distinction 
between Jews in general and the Israeli  
government is blurred. While a large two-
thirds majority of German respondents  
rejects the statement that “the policies  
of the Israeli government make me less  
sympathetic towards Jews,” over one-quarter 
(28 percent) agree with it. Thus nearly one  
in three Germans subscribes to a negative 
stereotype about Jews.
Agreement with the statement: “What the state of Israeli is doing to the Palestinians today is essentially the same thing as what the Nazis 
did to the Jews in the Third Reich.” Not included: “Don’t know, no response.” Question not posed in Israel. 
Figure 18: Comparison of Israeli policies with Nazi crimes (%)
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Jews have too much 
inﬂuence in the world
Figure 19: Anti-Semitism in Germany by age group (%) 
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“I absolutely disagree.” Not included: “Don't know, no response.”
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with Nazi crimes
23 24
19
28
38
15
29
21
30
38
43 45
38
43 41
Displayed are ﬁgures for “I fully agree” + “I tend to agree”
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
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2. History and Holocaust
4. Special relationship and responsibility
What are the implications of the special rela-
tionship between Germany and Israel today? 
Do Germans have a special responsibility be-
cause of the country’s Nazi past? The answer 
to these questions in Israel is unequivocal: 
Jewish Israelis largely believe that Germany 
has a special responsibility in general as well 
as responsibility towards Jews in particular. 
Although these two issues were addressed in 
the survey by separate questions, the results 
among Israelis were almost identical, with 
three-quarters of respondents indicating 
agreement (see figure 20).
4 Special relationship  
and responsibility
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Figure 20: Germany’s special responsibility (%)
Agreement with the statements: “Against the background of the history of National Socialism, today’s Germany bears a special 
responsibility” and “Against the background of the history of National Socialism, today’s Germany bears a special responsibility 
for the Jewish people.”
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74
Germany Israel
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73
Germany’s special responsibility Germany’s special responsibility 
for the Jewish people
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
Scale 1 (“I fully agree”)                 5 (“I absolutely disagree”). Displayed are responses 1 and 2.
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Responsibility for whom?
Similarly, in the discourse of the German 
political elite, entrenching the continuing 
responsibility of Germany for the Jewish 
people in public policy remains a bipartisan 
commitment and is repeatedly affirmed in 
speeches and commemorative events. How-
ever, the findings of the survey reveal more 
complex and differentiated attitudes among 
the German respondents. While a majority 
of Germans (61 percent) acknowledges that 
Germany bears a special responsibility, the 
object and substance of this responsibility 
is less clear. Only 40 percent believe that 
Germany has a special responsibility for the 
Jewish people (see figure 20).
As discussed above, Germany’s “never again” 
rests upon the basic idea of the universality 
of individual human rights and the protec-
tion of minorities. Moreover, the lessons of 
World War II involve a tendency to oppose 
war as an instrument of politics under all 
circumstances. Despite controversies about 
the participation of the German army in 
international missions, this peaceful mindset 
remains dominant in German political cul-
ture and implies a rejection of some aspects 
of Israel’s policies. 
  
Responsibility is therefore often defined in 
universalistic terms rather than as solidar-
ity with Israel. Israelis, in contrast, expect 
Germany to support Israel and its policies 
even in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
against regional threats such as that emanat-
ing from Iran. The different ideas about the 
precise implications of responsibility and the 
expectations that follow from these ideas can 
trigger controversies and conflicts, as will be 
discussed below.
Responsibility for Jewish life in  
Germany
While German respondents do not neces-
sarily interpret responsibility for the Jewish 
people as support for and solidarity with 
Israel, a majority of 74 percent believes that 
Germany has a responsibility to foster Jewish 
religion and culture in Germany. Among 
Israeli respondents, 80 percent agree with 
this statement.
“The different ideas about the precise 
   implications of responsibility  
and the expectations that follow  
            from these ideas can trigger  
  controversies and conflicts.”
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tion takes precedence over the parent’s right 
to perform a religious ritual. Representatives 
of the Jewish and Muslim communities 
criticized this ruling as an attack on freedom 
of religious expression, arguing that the 
prohibition of circumcision as a fundamental 
religious practice would constitute a threat to 
Jewish and Muslim life in Germany.
 
The majority of the participants in the public 
debate have failed to grasp the meaning of 
circumcision for religious and secular Jews 
alike as a constitutive symbol of belonging to 
the Jewish people. The present survey shows 
a high level of support for circumcision 
among religious (93 percent) and secular 
Jews (84 percent). The public discourse on 
“The German public seems to be  
   highly critical of special rights  
  for religious minorities,  
       which are expected to become  
 assimilated into mainstream culture.”
 
The data in figure 21 indicate a desire to 
restore the Jewish community in Germany. 
At the same time, the survey reveals a dis-
crepancy between respect for Jewish religion 
and culture on the one hand and a rather low 
willingness to accept circumcision as a ritual 
practice in Germany on the other. Only 14 
percent of German respondents fully agree 
that the German government should allow 
circumcision for religious reasons (among a 
total of 49 percent who agree), compared to 
77 percent among Jewish Israelis (among a 
total of 87 percent who agree). The question 
of circumcision became the focus of a public 
controversy in Germany after a court de-
clared circumcision for religious reasons ille-
gal in 2012. The court argued that the child’s 
right to bodily integrity and self-determina-
     “On the one hand, it is desired to restore 
 the Jewish community in Germany 
     but, on the other hand, there is a rather 
low willingness to accept circumcision  
           as a ritual practice.”
Agreement with the statement above. Respondents used a scale from 1 to 6 to state their opinion, with 1 meaning “I fully agree” and 
6 meaning “I absolutely disagree.”
Figure 21: Jewish culture and religion in Germany (%)
Fostering Jewish 
culture and religion 
in Germany
Allowing 
circumcision for 
religious reasons
19 12 49
39 19 16
5 5 77
23 12 14
Response of “1” (Fully agree)
Israel
Response of “2” 
Response of “3” 
Germany
Response of “1” (Fully agree)
Response of “2” 
Response of “3” 
Scale 1 (“I fully agree”)                 6 (“I absolutely disagree”). Displayed are responses 1, 2 and 3.
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
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circumcision went as far as voicing anti-Se-
mitic remarks based on traditional and anti-
Judaistic stereotypes. In the end, however, 
the German parliament passed a law which 
permitted circumcision for religious reasons 
in Germany. But the dispute goes beyond 
circumcision; it demonstrates discomfort 
among the German population over the grow-
ing public visibility of minority religious 
practices. The German public seems to be 
highly critical of special rights for religious 
minorities, which are expected to become 
assimilated into mainstream culture.
Responsibility and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict
Responsibility too takes on specific meaning 
in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict. How do responsibility and remembrance 
of the past translate into concrete policies? 
How do the lessons learned affect interna-
tional politics and bilateral relations? How do 
German and Israeli perceptions of interna-
tional conflicts and their resolution differ?
 
Since the end of World War II, there has been 
an overriding principle within German polit-
ical life that political problems are not to be 
solved by military action. Although Germany 
has taken part in military operations in part-
nership with other countries since the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, it has generally done so in a 
limited and highly coordinated way. The fact 
is that the normative public environment 
still holds that military measures are not 
appropriate solutions to political problems. 
Israeli attitudes to the use of force are very 
different: For Jewish Israelis, the lesson of 
the Holocaust implied the need to create 
a strong and independent state capable of 
defending the lives and safety of the Jewish 
people. This belief was further strengthened 
by the experiences of wars and intractable 
conflict. Accordingly, 44 percent of Israeli 
respondents fully agree that some issues in 
international relations can only be solved 
“While Germans and Israelis share 
    a commitment to democratic  
principles, one important difference  
      relates to the use of military  
force in international conflicts.”
Figure 22: Use of military force in international politics (%)
“I am convinced that 
there are situations 
in international politics 
that can only be solved 
with military force.”
23 17 14
19 4415
Agreement with the statement above. Respondents used a scale from 1 to 6 to state their opinion, with 1 meaning “I fully agree” and 
6 meaning “I absolutely disagree.” 
Response of “1” (Fully agree)
Israel
Response of “2” 
Response of “3” 
Germany
Response of “1” (Fully agree)
Response of “2” 
Response of “3” 
Scale 1 (“I fully agree”)                 6 (“I absolutely disagree”). Displayed are Scales 1, 2 and 3.
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
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For me as German chancellor, therefore, 
Israel’s security will never be open to 
negotiation” (Presse- und Informationsamt 
der Bundesregierung 2008). The current coa-
lition government (consisting of the Chris-
tian Democratic Union, the Christian Social 
Union, and the Social Democratic Party) has 
included this commitment to Israel’s security 
in its coalition agreement and, with respect 
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, reaffirmed 
the position that only a two-state solution 
can provide security and peace for Israelis 
and Palestinians (Presse- und Informations-
amt der Bundesregierung 2013).
However, there is clearly disagreement about 
which side has the support of the govern-
ment and the German population: 52 percent 
are convinced that the German government 
tends to side with Israel (figure 23). One-fifth 
believe that the government supports both 
sides, and just 2 percent believe it supports 
the Palestinians. In contrast, only one-third 
by military force, while only 14 percent of 
German respondents express full agreement 
with this premise. Taking all levels of ap-
proval together, more than three-quarters of 
Israeli respondents (78 percent) support the 
use of force under certain conditions, while 
the German sample is almost equally divided 
(54 percent agree with the statement, see 
figure 22). These differences can also be 
detected in attitudes towards the Israeli-
Palestinian and the Middle Eastern conflict, 
as will be discussed below.
Angela Merkel reconfirmed Germany’s 
commitment to and responsibility for Israel 
in her speech before the Israeli parliament 
on March 18, 2008. She concluded: “Here 
of all places I want to explicitly stress that 
every German government and every Ger-
man chancellor before me has shouldered 
Germany’s special historical responsibility 
for Israel’s security. This historical respon-
sibility is part of my country’s raison d’être. 
Question: “In your opinion, which side of the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict does the German government support?” 
Not included: “Don't know, no response.” 
Figure 23: Whom does the German government support? (%)
Deﬁnitely Israel/
Probably Israel
Both equally
Probably the Palestinians/
Deﬁnitely the Palestinians 
Neither
52
36
20
34
2
15
3
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IsraelGermany
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
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of German respondents believe that the  
German population favors Israel. Moreover,  
9 percent say the Germans support the 
Palestinians, while one-quarter believe the 
population sides with both parties equally 
and 19 percent with none (see figure 24).
These differences point to a growing discrep-
ancy between the government and the popu-
lation in regard to Israel-related policy. And 
indeed, a majority of German respondents  
do not want the German government to take 
sides in the Israeli Palestinian conflict – only 
15 percent demand support for the Israeli 
side and 5 percent for the Palestinians, while 
the majority prefers either to support both 
sides equally (42 percent) or to remain neu-
tral (32 percent, see figure 25).
 
The desire for the German government  
to support Israel is especially low among  
the younger respondents aged under 30,  
only 8 percent of whom are in favor. These 
findings reveal that the younger generation  
has an attitude of increasing detachment  
and criticism towards Israel.
“The younger generation  
     in Germany has an attitude of  
 increasing detachment and criticism 
           towards Israel.”
Question: “In your opinion, which side of the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict does the German public support?” 
Not included: “Don't know, no response.” 
Figure 24: Whom does the German public support? (%)
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Probably the Palestinians/
Deﬁnitely the Palestinians 
Neither
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
44
conflict is almost twice as high (36 percent) 
as that of respondents who think that it 
supports the Palestinians (19 percent); the 
remainder view Germany’s government as 
supporting both sides equally. These figures 
were recorded after a period in which Ger-
man Chancellor Angela Merkel took steps to 
criticize Israeli policy, such as abstaining in 
the November 2012 UN vote on Palestinian 
statehood (as opposed to voting against it) 
and openly disagreeing with settlement 
expansion in December 2012, just before  
the survey went into the field.
“Israelis have less trust in the   
  German population, but believe that  
the German government  
        is committed to supporting 
  Israel politically.”
It is obvious that Israelis would expect 
Germany to support Israel, but this is most 
Israeli respondents have different percep-
tions of the position of the German public 
and the German government regarding the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One-third (33 per-
cent) of the Israeli respondents believe the 
German people side with the Palestinians, 
but only 16 percent think the German people 
side with Israel, as figure 24 shows – this is 
perhaps the only indication that Israelis have 
some awareness of the negative attitudes in 
Germany towards Israel today. The remain-
der believe that the German people side with 
both equally. Roughly one-third of the Israeli 
respondents believe that both the people 
and the government side with both Israelis 
and Palestinians equally. This indicates once 
again that Israelis have less trust in the 
German population, but believe that the Ger-
man government is committed to supporting 
Israel politically – even if it also seeks to 
take an impartial stance (see figures 23 and 
24). Thus the proportion of respondents 
who believe that the German government 
supports Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian 
Deﬁnitely Israel/
Probably Israel
Both equally
Probably the Palestinians/
Deﬁnitely the Palestinians 
Neither
Question: “If you could decide, whom should the German government support?” Not inlcuded: “Don't know, no response.” 
Figure 25: Whom should the German government support? (%)
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likely only partly for historical reasons and 
mainly because Israelis would prefer that 
outsiders in general, especially Western 
European democracies, take their side. Recall 
the chapter on identity showing that Israelis 
largely believe that their country is morally 
in the right. Given that nearly 70 percent of 
respondents say they would prefer the Ger-
man government to take their side, the only 
surprising thing about these findings is that 
20 percent would prefer Germany to support 
both sides equally.
The basic finding that a strong majority 
would like the German government’s support 
is borne out by the responses to another 
question asking whether the German govern-
ment should support the Israeli position on 
the conflict. Figure 26 shows that 83 percent 
of Jewish Israelis say yes, over half of them 
agreeing completely. Moreover, Israelis 
also expect concrete support in defending 
the country by military means: 81 percent 
say that Germany should support Israel by 
supplying weapons and 75 percent want the 
German government to support a military 
strike against Iran. German respondents 
clearly oppose both a military solution to 
the conflict and government consent to such 
policies. Less than one-fifth support the de-
livery of arms and only 16 percent want the 
German government to approve a military 
strike against Iran.
With regard to the resolution of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, a large majority of 
German respondents think that both sides 
are required to make concessions. However, 
more Germans believe that Israel is the par-
ty that ought to strike a compromise in the 
conflict than that the Palestinians should (17 
percent, compared to 7 percent, see figure 
27). With minor variations, the breakdown of 
responses to this question has not changed 
dramatically over the last few surveys. 
Agree to a military 
strike against Iran
11 32
17 11 47
Support the Israeli 
position in the 
Middle East conﬂict
31 10 7
16 14 53
Agreement with the statement above. Respondents used a scale from 1 to 6 to state their opinion, with 1 meaning “under all circumstances” 
and 6 meaning “under no circumstances.”
Figure 26: What should the German government do? (%)
Supply weapons 
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Response of “1” (under all circumstances)
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Source: TNS Emnid 2013
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Yet, as shown in figure 27, over half the 
Israelis (53 percent) also believe that both 
sides must compromise, which means that 
they tend to have a fairly balanced view of 
the conflict and its potential solution. This 
figure has remained quite stable since the 
first survey in 1991, and although a higher 
portion of Germans cite both sides as need-
ing to compromise, it is important to realize 
that both Germany and Israel have a clear 
majority that believes in the need for both 
sides to make concessions.
Unsurprisingly, there is a wide margin 
between Israelis who think the Palestinians 
should do the compromising (40 percent) 
and those who think Israel must compromise 
more (6 percent). This tiny minority is even 
smaller than the portion of Israelis who 
describe themselves as “left-wing,” which 
generally runs between 18–20 percent of 
Israeli Jews.
 
    “It is important to realize that both  
            Germany and Israel  
           have a clear majority that believes  
   in the need for both sides  
                         to make concessions.”
Israelis
Figure 27: Who should make concessions in the Middle East conﬂict? (%)
Question: “In your opinion, who should make concessions in the Middle East conﬂict: the Israelis, the Palestinians, or both?”
Not included: “Don't know, no response.”
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Responsibility and policy  
towards Iran
Like the Israelis, a majority of Germans 
believe that Israel faces an existential threat 
from the Iranian nuclear program, with near-
ly 60 percent agreeing that this is the case 
(see figure 28). However, Germans are much 
more cautious and restrained about the 
wisdom of a military strike; just one-third 
believe that a military strike against Iran is 
justified if sanctions are ineffective. This data 
has not changed since 2007. This might be 
explained by the fact that most Germans do 
not perceive the Iranian nuclear program as 
a direct threat to themselves. Furthermore, 
there is a general fear in Germany that a 
military attack on Iran could escalate into  
a regional and even global conflict. The po-
tential political and economic conse quences 
for Germany are a further deterrent to sup-
port for military action in Iran.
Almost two-thirds of Israelis (62 percent) 
view the Iranian nuclear program as an 
existential threat to Israel. It is notable that 
over one-third (35 percent) do not share this 
view and that the number of those who do 
agree has dropped from 75 percent in 2007. 
Yet the latter finding is overshadowed by 
the fact that fully three-quarters would find 
a military strike justified in the event that 
Iran proceeds with its nuclear development 
program despite the diplomatic sanctions. 
However, this percentage has decreased 
slightly from 2007, when fully 80 percent 
responded affirmatively to the same question 
(see figure 29).
Figure 28: Threat to Israel by Iran’s nuclear program (%)
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The consistently high marks Israelis give to 
Germany mean that it has higher credibility 
in Israel at the political level than any other 
European country. The support Germany 
has provided over the years in international 
institutions has certainly contributed to this 
credibility. The fact that Israelis and Ger-
mans also view the goal of Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict resolution through the same broad 
lens of symmetry – which is to say that 
majorities in both countries believe that both 
sides (Israelis and Palestinians) should make 
concessions – reveals a measure of align-
ment on a highly sensitive issue.
           “Germany has higher  
credibility in Israel at the  
    political level than any other  
        European country.”
While the sense of an existential threat is 
fairly consistent across demographic groups, 
support for a military strike is consistent-
ly higher among religious respondents 
and younger people. Two-thirds of secular 
Israelis say that a strike would be justified in 
the event that diplomatic measures fail, but 
among religious respondents the agreement 
rate is almost 90 percent; similarly, 62 per-
cent of respondents over 60 support a mili-
tary strike compared to 84 percent of young 
people up to the age of 29. These findings  
are very consistent with trends through - 
 out Israeli history showing that the more 
religiously observant members of society  
are more hard-line in various ways. Because  
these communities have high birth rates, 
this correlation has contributed to right-
leaning and hard-line trends among the 
younger age groups in Israel.
Figure 29: Legitimacy of a military strike against Iran (%)
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However, despite the ongoing and bipartisan 
commitment of the German political elite 
to the state of Israel, the survey indicates 
that the attitudes of the German public are 
more complex: Whereas Israeli respondents 
assume that Germany has a responsibility 
towards the Jewish people, Germans are 
less likely to do so and more likely to define 
responsibility in terms of universalistic 
concepts such as the promotion of individual 
human rights or the protection of minorities. 
Consequently, a majority of respondents is 
rather critical of the assumed government 
support of Israel and does not want Germany 
to take sides in the conflict.
These differences also become apparent in 
the attitudes of the two societies to the use of 
military force and to policy options regarding 
Iran’s nuclear program. 
The discrepancy is rooted both in the central 
concerns of each country and their political 
cultures: Israel fears for its security and 
its very existence (with a majority, albeit a 
smaller one than in the past, still perceiving 
Iran as an existential threat) and is thus 
significantly more likely to justify a mili-
tary approach. Germany does not perceive 
itself to be under an existential threat, but 
acknowledges that Iran poses such a threat 
to Israel. However, in accordance with its 
post-war principles, it tends to dismiss the 
idea that military measures will contribute 
to solving the problems or ameliorating  
this threat.
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5. Conclusion
The present study offers a nuanced overview 
of the current state of German-Israeli relations. 
One of its core findings is that these relations 
are anything but “normal,” since they remain 
colored by the events of history. As a crucial 
factor shaping the identity and the national 
self-image of both countries, the Holocaust 
remains a negative point of reference, and for 
Jewish Israelis, the past is closely linked with 
the perceived necessity for a Jewish state.  
A clear majority is in favor of preserving the 
memory of the Holocaust in the future and 
believes that the past remains relevant to 
the present day and to Israel’s relations with 
Germany. In contrast, German respondents 
tend to underestimate the extent to which the 
Holocaust continues to shape Israel’s percep-
tion of Germany even today. Germans are more 
likely to focus their attention on present-day 
issues and put the past – explicitly including 
the Holocaust – behind them. In this context, 
the study shows that younger respondents 
in Germany are much more likely to endorse 
calls for closure.
One crucial question addressed by the survey 
concerns the perception and interpretation 
of the special responsibility which is often 
ascribed to Germany because of its history. 
While Germans and Israelis both share the 
opinion that Germany bears such a special 
responsibility, they have different views about 
the implications, expectations, and conclusi-
ons that arise from it. Israelis expect Germany 
not only to support the Jewish people, but also 
to side with the state of Israel in current con-
flicts. Germans, in contrast, believe that their 
responsibility is of a more abstract nature, 
which is expressed in support for the rights 
of the individual and for liberal democratic 
principles. Since they are also fundamentally 
skeptical about the use of military force in 
political conflicts, they do not necessarily hold 
that their country’s responsibility (which they 
acknowledge) implies an obligation to provide 
political support for Israel, much less military 
assistance. These discrepancies are intensified 
by the challenges which both countries must 
face in the present and the future. The Israelis, 
who live in an environment of constantly sim-
mering conflicts that could break out into open 
violence at any time, are more likely to favor 
military measures and, under certain condi-
tions, even the limitation of civil rights. The 
Germans, who are not exposed to comparable 
existential threats, are much more hesitant to 
condone the use of military force.
Despite the events of the past, Israelis have a 
more positive view of the German government 
and the German state than the Germans have 
of Israel and its administration. Most Israelis 
believe that today’s Germany is not only a 
friendly nation, but also an ally of Israel, and 
the number of people who share this posi-
tive perception has increased significantly 
and steadily over the past decades. However, 
younger Israelis are noticeably more critical of 
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Germany and its government than their older 
compatriots.
In contrast, the German public has a consid-
erably more ambivalent perception of Israel 
and is almost equally divided between positive 
and negative attitudes to the country. In fact, 
the majority of German respondents have a 
negative view of the Israeli government, and 
this assessment may have a detrimental effect 
on their overall perception of Israel. The study 
shows that the attitudes of most Germans are 
not exclusively shaped by the past. They are 
also influenced and colored by perceptions 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, resulting in 
a critical and partially negative assessment 
of Israel that is particularly prevalent among 
younger Germans.
The survey results thus indicate an increasing 
discrepancy between Germany’s political 
leadership and the German population, in 
that one in two respondents does not want the 
German government to provide even political 
support for Israel in the Middle East conflict; 
arms deliveries are rejected by a large majori-
ty of 80 percent of all Germans.
Agreement with various forms of anti-Semi-
tism is alarmingly high. Over one-quarter of 
respondents, predominantly among the older 
age cohorts, endorsed traditional anti-Semitic 
stereotypes, which appear to be fairly con-
sistent, stable, and resistant to change. The 
survey results also reveal a worrying increase 
in Israel-specific anti-Semitism in recent years. 
Combating various forms of anti-Semitism 
thus remains an important ongoing challenge 
for German society.
What is the significance of these findings for 
German-Israeli relations half a century after 
the start of bilateral diplomatic relations? 
A variety of mechanisms for encounter and 
exchange between Germany and Israel have 
been created in recent decades. However, 
successful dialog is contingent upon certain 
prerequisites, one of which is a basis of shared 
experiences in the past and/or the present; 
another is a shared lifeworld shaped by similar 
values, basic principles, interests, and identi-
ties. The data from the present survey show 
that conditions in Germany and Israel do not 
always meet these prerequisites.
It will therefore be an important task in the 
future to create forms of exchange and dialog 
that enable each side to understand the 
similarities and differences of the other. This 
discourse must be nuanced and multi-layered 
in order to do justice to the different political 
and cultural contexts and security situations 
that prevail in each country and thus to avoid 
misunderstandings and distorted perceptions. 
If this succeeds, dialog and exchange can 
help each side to learn from the other and can 
create a basis of trust for strengthening and 
deepening bilateral relations in the future.
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ably the most important living German writer 
and a winner of the Nobel Prize, wrote a po-
lemical poem in which he presented Israel as 
a chronic enemy of world peace and alleged 
that the Jewish state was planning a nuclear 
strike against Iran. The circumcision debate, 
which affects Jews and Muslims alike, is a 
more complex matter, since it created the  
impression of a conflict between improved 
child protection and an archaic, outdated 
ritual resulting in bodily harm. This implied 
conflict, however, was fraught with texts and 
subtexts that pointed to deeper levels of dis-
course: levels with a theological character,  
albeit one in secular clothing.
 
The emotions that come to the surface in the 
context of these kinds of controversies show 
that the relationship between Germans and 
Israeli Jews is prone to massive disruption 
despite the impression of stability created  
“The relationship 
        between Germans and 
     Israeli Jews is prone to 
massive disruption  
    despite the impression  
  of stability.”
The current survey on the relationship 
between Germans and Israeli Jews reveals no 
significant deviations from the findings of its 
predecessor in the year 2007. The answers 
have remained largely the same, and since 
they are borne out by surveys from earlier 
years as well, it is possible to identify a kind 
of structural consistency. But does this mean 
that there is nothing new to say about the 
relationship between Germany/the Germans 
and Israel/the Israeli Jews?
 
On closer examination, the empirically iden-
tifiable consistency turns out to be highly 
ambivalent, and the ambivalence is clearly 
apparent whenever sporadically occurring 
controversies become the subject of public 
debate. One recent example is the outrage 
about Israel that was kindled in the Middle 
East during the survey period, while other 
controversies – such as the now-forgotten 
Günter Grass affair and the debate about  
circumcision – centered around the Jewish 
community in Germany. Günter Grass, argu-
“On closer examination, 
      the empirically identifiable  
  consistency turns out to be  
    highly ambivalent.”
Continuity in spite of change?
Thoughts on the relationship  
between Germany and Israeli Jews
by Dan Diner1
1  This text was written in spring 2013. 
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by the survey data. Disruption is particularly 
likely when the issue concerns the core ele-
ments of each culture’s self-image: the ques-
tions of peace (which is interpreted differently 
based on each culture’s historical experience) 
and of physical markers of membership 
which have their roots in religion. The image 
invoked by Grass in his poem – of a Jewish 
community suspected of wantonly plotting a 
global conflagration, even though the actual 
danger in the face-off between Israel and 
Iran emanates from the other side – runs 
deep. Even the words he chose for describing 
the circumstances of its composition reso-
nate with the authority of an author’s last 
will and testament: “Last ink” – in other 
words, the last word. This, clearly, is how 
Grass wishes to be remembered by posterity. 
It might seem surprising that someone like 
Grass, whose track record as a champion of 
the Federal Republic’s enlightened body poli-
tic since the early 1960s is second to none, 
would adopt so theological – albeit crypto- 
theological – a tone in his latter years. It 
seems as though the modern Jewish state  
is being burdened with much of what the 
Christian tradition associates with the Biblical 
significance of Israel: deep-seated associa-
tions that can be invoked time and time 
again without the speakers even becoming 
aware of them. It is no surprise that these 
deep levels should make themselves felt in 
the circumcision debate, since this issue 
could hardly have acquired the status of an 
unconditional imperative were it not for its 
theological significance.
Changing parameters
In the decades-long chronicle of the German- 
Israeli relationship, the poem by Grass and 
the circumcision debate are milestones con-
spicuous for their shock value. Their true 
significance arises from the history of a rela-
tionship which, today, is characterized by a 
high degree of calmness and normality. As 
such, they point towards a complex which 
can only be described as exceedingly ambiv-
alent. Ultimately, the relationship between 
Germany and Israel’s Jews is one of paradox.
 
The political discourse is dominated by  
the situation in the Near and Middle East,  
especially by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
whose historical course exhibits a peculiarly 
repetitive character which shows that the 
odds of a resolution being found are not 
good. But although no end appears to be in 
     “The Arab-Israeli   
  conflict appears to be  
losing its priority status amid
        the upheavals in  
    the region.”
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In Europe, too, the familiar parameters are 
changing. To date, the universally accepted 
narrative has been that the process of Euro-
pean unification is geared towards an ever- 
increasing integration. During the debt  
crisis, however, the currency union and the 
goal of shared standards have caused exist-
ing habitual differences in administrative 
and economic practices to emerge more 
strongly and have accentuated the different 
national characteristics of the various Euro-
pean countries. None of these factors are  
directly related to the German-Israeli rela-
tionship, although they have tended to spot-
light questions of collective belonging – in 
other words, of the increasing support for 
Eurosceptical and anti-European parties  
and movements. It was the years and even 
decades of unbroken progress towards Euro-
peanization that helped to neutralize national 
differences and historical fault lines in the 
relationship between the European coun-
tries, and Europe’s Jews, especially the Jews 
in Germany, were among the beneficiaries  
of these processes of neutralization and 
growing integration.
Another factor that adds a new dimension to 
the relationship between Germany and Isra-
eli Jews is the presence of Islam in Europe in 
general and Germany in particular. Ritually 
speaking, Judaism and Islam are closer to 
each other than to Christianity both in terms 
of dietary rules and, above all, in stipulating 
circumcision. As long as the dietary rules 
– especially those concerning kosher (or, in 
the case of Islam, halal) slaughter – are not 
associated with the circumcision of male 
infants, the lurking theological undertones 
are unlikely to place an undue burden on the 
circumcision debate. However, should this 
change and should such demands emanate 
from sources not well-disposed towards 
    “In Europe, too, the 
familiar parameters   
           are changing.”
sight, the situation is not a static one, even 
though the changes pertain to the region  
in general rather than to the intermittently 
resurgent conflict itself. Between the 2007 
survey on the German-Jewish/Israeli rela-
tions and the present one, the situation in 
the region underwent a fundamental change. 
The revolts that were originally billed as an 
“Arab Spring” have had a different impact  
on every country, but they have drastically 
rearranged the political topography of the 
Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict. More than 
two years after the start of the upheavals, the 
Arab world is in the grip of a Sunnite revo-
lution. Syria has been particularly severely 
affected – to put it mildly – but this does not 
exonerate the Assad regime of responsibility. 
The regional balance of power has shifted 
dramatically and the possibilities for achiev-
ing peace are now subject to entirely differ-
ent influences than before – if they have not 
receded beyond the horizon. This does not 
mean that a two-state solution for achieving 
peace between Israel and the Palestinians is 
now a dead letter. On the contrary, such a 
peace – if it can be brought about – would 
contribute to defusing the situation. But the 
likelihood of such a solution significantly  
improving stability in the region is steadily 
decreasing. In more dramatic terms, the  
Arab-Israeli conflict appears to be losing its 
priority status amid the upheavals in the  
region. The social protests of the past and  
the results of the last Israeli elections have 
shown that the Israeli people are turning in-
ward and that the solution of the Palestinian 
conflict is losing its urgency, and indeed that 
the relative importance of a peaceful solution 
is waning in the face of the upheavals in  
the region. Social questions, the issue of  
distributive justice, and good governance  
appear to have become more relevant than 
the existential issue of war and peace.
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Muslims, then the German/Christian-Jewish 
relationship too might be adversely affected.
 
The relationship between Jews and Muslims 
in Germany is under strain as well. Repre-
sentatives of Germany’s Jewish community 
have openly declared that they intend to 
speak only for themselves in the circumcision 
debate and that they do not intend to work 
together with the Muslims in this regard. 
What separates the two faith communities is 
the vexing Palestinian question. Even more 
so than in Germany, this prolonged conflict 
has caused Jews and Muslims to become  
estranged from each other in France, with  
its complex colonial history and its laicist  
republican self-image. Germany’s traditional 
confessionalism and state-church law offer 
much better possibilities for integration.
Against the background of the broader  
political and social context, let us now  
examine the survey results in greater detail. 
In view of the contextual changes described 
above, the stability of the survey results over 
time should be re-examined for subtle shifts 
that might conceivably indicate a degree  
of change.
The existence of the state: Assured 
or contested?
In this section, we will highlight certain  
conspicuous aspects of the current survey  
results in order to identify the recurrent  
features of the relationship between Germany 
and Israeli Jews. These aspects include ele-
ments which are connected both with the 
past (i.e. the Nazi era and the Holocaust) and 
with the Middle East conflict and which in-
volve such antithetical parameters as the  
“The relationship between 
      Jews and Muslims 
in Germany is under strain 
                           as well.”
assured, tranquil existence of the German 
state and the chronic insecurity that charac-
terizes the state of Israel. The common fea-
tures, differences, and contrasts that emerge 
from the survey are largely rooted in these 
existential conditions, which could hardly  
be more dissimilar.
To see this dissimilarity, one need look no 
further than the question about the value of 
collective or national belonging. To ask this 
question in Germany and Israel is to invite 
the expression of widely diverging opinions, 
since the two states are in diametrical oppo-
sition to each other on this issue. Unlike  
Germany, Israel is a very young and not fully 
consolidated state which does not yet regard 
its nation-building project as complete even 
though it was founded over a generation ago. 
Thus it is no surprise that 90 percent of  
Israeli respondents regard their nationality 
as an important component of their self- 
image. What could come as a surprise is that 
almost 80 percent of German respondents 
feel the same. This suggests that collective 
belonging has a higher value in Germany 
than one might assume, given that the public 
discourse in Germany is dominated by a 
pro-European thrust on the one hand and a 
post-national one on the other. The debate is 
more dramatic in Israel, since it takes place 
against the background of perennial conflict 
and must therefore always address the ques-
tion of the state’s legitimacy. This issue  
always causes emotions to run high.
The question about national belonging or 
identification with the collective was fol-
lowed up in both countries by an exploration 
of respondents’ attitudes to the protection  
of individual rights and the acceptance of  
nationally and culturally diverse minorities. 
The responses clearly show that there is a 
greater readiness to protect minority and  
individual rights in Germany than in Israel. 
There are two reasons for this difference: 
First, that civil society in Germany has a 
more pronounced desire to limit the powers 
of the state (protection of individual rights) 
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Germans and Jews, this is not so much unfor-
tunate as an expression of normality; it could 
suggest that the past is being superseded by 
an open focus on the present and the future 
as the dominant element in German-Israeli 
Jewish relations. In the world of the future, 
the Other is not necessarily ubiquitous as  
a constituent factor for the construction of 
one’s identity. In other words, Germans and 
Jews no longer define themselves in terms of 
their historical relationship to each other. In 
contrast, during the first decades after the 
Holocaust, the Other was a constant pres-
ence. However, the survey shows that there 
is also a tendency that runs counter to this 
trend, albeit to a limited extent: The Israeli 
public is divided in its attitudes to Germany, 
although the majority has a fairly good opin-
ion about the country. This attitude changes 
when controversial events in Germany or the 
Middle East recall the familiar images from 
the past, causing the structural ambivalence 
of the relationship to manifest itself.
The fact that Germany is increasingly viewed 
in a positive light in Israel may be related to 
generational change. Paradoxically, however, 
this does not mean that younger people in  
Israel generally have a positive attitude to-
wards Germany while the older generation 
does not. Rather, Israelis aged over 60 have  
a more favorable view of Germany than the 
youngest respondents. The reason is not that 
older people have a greater affinity towards 
the past, but that they tend to act more pru-
dently and circumspectly than adolescents, 
who generally prefer clear-cut distinctions 
and tend to think in stereotypical categories.
 
“It should be noted that, in  
           Germany, there is a massive  
difference between opinions 
about Israel in general 
       and about the Israeli 
government and its policies.”
and is more willing to accept cultural differ-
ences (minority rights). This would indicate 
that liberal attitudes are entrenched in the 
country’s political thought. Second, that  
attitudes in Israel are conditioned by the  
Arab-Palestinian conflict, which is ultimately 
demographical in character and which raises 
the population’s willingness to prioritize  
security considerations over human rights 
and liberal issues. Thus the Arab minority  
in Israel – that is, Palestinians with Israeli 
citizenship – are collectively suspected of 
aloofness or even outright hostility towards 
the Israeli state, an attitude rooted both in 
the conflict situation as a whole and in the 
fact that Israel is explicitly defined as a Jew-
ish state. It must therefore be borne in mind 
that the Arab minority in Israel is juxtaposed 
with a Jewish majority which, in turn, repre-
sents a minority within the Arab Muslim  
majority population of the Middle East as a 
whole. This paradoxical inversion lies at the 
core of the conflict. Democracy in Israel is 
therefore under siege on two fronts: that  
of demographics (majority vs. minority), 
through which ethnic and national affiliation 
implies a political bonus or penalty, and that 
of the ever-present possibility of the inver-
sion of the majority/minority status. The  
demographically driven conflict between the 
distrusted Arab minority in Israel and the  
Israeli Jews as a minority in a predominantly 
Arab Muslim region is distinct from the hos-
tility which other ethnicities, such as black 
African refugees, encounter in Israel. This 
hostility is rooted not in any demographic 
conflict, but in xenophobia; the refugees, 
whose status implies a relative lack of rights, 
are branded by their ethnic visibility and  
collectively associated with certain social  
attributes, such as delinquency.
In the eyes of the Other
With respect to the relationship between the 
Germans and Israeli Jews, it is notable that 
the data indicate a mutual lack of interest. 
Considering the events of the past that con-
tinue to burden the relationship between 
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It should be noted that, in Germany, there 
is a massive difference between opinions 
about Israel in general and about the Israeli 
government and its policies. This kind of 
discrepancy is usually observed in assess-
ments of countries under authoritarian or 
dictatorial rule, where the state power and 
the population are in opposition to each 
other. Israel, however, is a democracy whose 
government reflects the opinions of the ma-
jority. Government policy and the body poli-
tic are not in a state of arbitrary divergence. 
The striking difference in attitudes to the 
Israeli people and their government appears 
to indicate that the opinions of the Germans 
about Israel are significantly less positive 
than the survey data would suggest. The 
data may reflect statements that owe more 
to the influence of history than to the actual 
feelings of the respondents making them. 
The very negative attitude of the Germans 
to the Israeli government and its policies 
may to a large extent reflect their attitudes 
to Israel as a whole, and this is attributable 
to the influence of the Palestinian conflict. 
The relatively large proportion of German 
respondents who compare or equate Israel’s 
policies towards the Palestinians with the 
treatment of the Jews by the Nazis should 
be cause for concern, since it suggests that 
attitudes are being shaped not only by the 
complex parameters of the conflict, but by 
deeper motivations. The majority of German 
respondents say that their attitude to Israel 
is influenced by their country’s Nazi past. 
Thus their reservations about Israel may be 
primarily attributable to Germany’s history 
rather than to their attitudes to the Middle 
East conflict.
The extent to which the two political cultures 
differ on issues such as conflict, military 
force, and the use of violence can be seen in 
their willingness or unwillingness to support 
Israel in the event of a conflict. This willing-
ness is determined primarily by physical dis-
tance from the conflict; while it would surely 
not be wrong to assume that other underly-
ing factors are at work as well, they play a 
subordinate role. The effects of physical  
distance, incidentally, can be discerned in 
all the survey data concerning the conflict, 
even in the stance on the Iranian nuclear 
program.
Ambivalent signals for Jewish 
culture in Germany
A similar picture emerges from the sur-
vey data about fostering Jewish culture in 
Germany. Approval for such support appears 
to be driven largely by a sense of obligation 
to atone for the past – though it may also be 
expressed in lieu of a political opinion, which 
many people prefer to keep to themselves.  
A similar attitude emerges with respect to Is-
rael. Germans began to develop an increased 
interest in Israeli literature at exactly the 
point when their political interest in Israel 
was, for obvious reasons, fading. Opinions 
about circumcision are more or less equally 
divided, although it is interesting to note that 
one-third of German respondents oppose 
circumcision “under any circumstances.” 
This would seem to represent something of a 
qualified majority, even though circumcision 
is a religious obligation and therefore one of 
the non-negotiable core elements of Judaism.
 
The consistently positive attitude of Israelis 
towards the promotion of Jewish culture in 
Germany appears to be a new phenomenon. 
It is not clear, however, whether Israeli 
respondents took this to mean fostering the 
culture of the Jewish community or the pre-
servation of the Jewish heritage as though 
in a museum. What is notable is that, unlike 
in the first decades of Israel’s existence, the 
presence of Jews in Germany is no longer 
perceived in Israel as a sacrilege: On the con-
trary, it is not only accepted matter-of-factly, 
“One-third of German 
     respondents oppose 
circumcision ‘under any  
          circumstances.’”
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the elites who understand the differences is 
confirmed by the 2013 survey. Notwithstand-
ing the structural differences between the 
two communities, the survey is also, to some 
extent, an expression of the stability and 
continuity of the political cultures of the two 
countries, Germany and Israel, which are 
linked together in so remarkable a fashion.
       “The efforts by 
successive generations 
         to come to terms with the 
Nazi period can be regarded  
             as a core element 
of Germany’s political culture.”
but actively endorsed by fairly large sections 
of the population. The survey does not offer 
information about the extent to which this 
may be due to generational preferences or 
other factors of the present-day lifeworld that 
result from the Israelization of Israeli Jews.
Dealing with tensions
When it comes to the Nazi persecution of the 
Jews and related events, responses in Ger-
many are remarkably consistent. The survey 
shows that the Germans have accepted their 
trans-generational responsibility for the Nazi 
past, even if this acceptance can take a wide 
range of different forms. Calls for closure are 
heard at irregular intervals, and the protest 
they elicit results in a renewed focus on the 
Nazi era and the Holocaust as its central 
phenomenon. In this sense, the efforts by 
successive generations to come to terms 
with the Nazi period can be regarded as a 
core element of Germany’s political culture. 
This does not mean, however, that Germans 
and Israelis draw the same conclusions from 
their engagement with the issue. Rather, it 
is a reference point which may give rise to 
contradicting inferences – not only because 
of cultural or religious differences, but pri-
marily because of the political circumstances 
of the two states, foremost among which is 
the relatively safe situation of Germany in 
the heart of Europe and the insecure location 
of the Jewish state in the Middle East. Thus 
the two cultures have different and even 
contradictory parameters for assessing and 
evaluating the past. Any identifiable common 
ground exists despite rather than because 
of the prevailing circumstances in the two 
countries and may arise from ideological 
convictions or superordinated interests -- but 
not from each society’s existential experien-
ces. As these experiences are the primary 
driving force behind each country’s social 
reality, the political and cultural regulation 
of hidden, “objective” tensions must always 
begin anew in order to channel them into 
manageable paths. That this process of 
regulation is fundamentally a project for 
59
Germany and Israel Today
60
Appendix
Comparison of Trends  
2013 – 2014
Methodology
To identify possible attitude shifts in the  
German population, seven questions from 
the 2013 survey were reused in a snap 
survey carried out by the opinion research 
institute TNS Emnid. The data were gath-
ered using Computer Assisted Telephone 
Interviewing tools and were based on the 
following parameters: 
• Sample size: 946 
•  Population: German-speaking population 
aged 18 and over and resident in private 
homes in the Federal Republic of Germany 
•  Dates of Fielding: 10/10/2014 to 
10/11/2014. 
•  The margin of error is +/– 3 percent with a 
confidence rate of 90 percent and a sample 
size of n = 946.
Opinions about Israel
The 2014 snap survey shows that opinions 
about Israel have deteriorated significantly. 
While 46 percent of respondents had ex-
pressed a good or fairly good opinion of Israel 
in 2013, this figure dropped to 36 percent  
in 2014. At the same time, the number of  
respondents expressing a fairly bad or very 
bad opinion of Israel rose from 42 percent  
to 48 percent. In addition, 16 percent  
(compared to 12 percent in 2013) gave no  
response. The 2013 survey suggested a  
connection between the responses to this 
question and respondents’ poor opinions of 
the Israeli government, which would indicate 
that Israel is being equated with Israeli  
government policies. If this is the case, it 
would explain the deterioration in the snap 
survey as well, since the Israeli govern-
ment’s policies in the 2014 Gaza conflict 
came under heavy criticism in the German 
media because of the high civilian casualties 
on the Palestinian side.
by Steffen Hagemann
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Comparison of Trends  
2013 – 2014
2013 2014
Very good Fairly good
Fairly bad Very bad
Figure 1: Opinion about Israel (%)
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Source: TNS Emnid 2013, 2014
Answers to the question: “In general, what do you think about Israel today? Do you have a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, very bad 
opinion of Israel?” (Difference from 100% = “don't know, no response”)
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It is interesting to note that there has been 
an increase in support for arms supplies to 
Israel, although overall approval remains 
at a comparatively low level: 29 percent of 
respondents are (to varying degrees) in favor 
of arms supplies, an increase of 10 percent 
compared to 2013. However, a clear majority 
of 68 percent (compared to 80 percent in 
2013) continues to reject them. The changes 
may indicate that the use of missiles against 
Israel by Hamas has slightly increased 
the public’s awareness of the necessity of 
military measures, even if approval for such 
measures remains qualified and tentative.
What should the German govern-
ment do?
There has been virtually no change in the 
answers to the question whether the German 
government should support the Israeli 
position in the Middle East conflict. Opinions 
in Germany seem to be largely fixed on this 
fundamental issue, so that events like the 
Gaza conflict have little impact on attitudes. 
Respondents are almost equally divided 
on this question, with 45 percent favoring 
and 50 percent opposing support for Israel. 
However, an examination of the highest and 
lowest answers only (the top two and bottom 
two boxes) shows that the proportion of 
respondents who emphatically reject support 
for Israel is almost twice as high (at 32 per-
cent) as the proportion of respondents who 
are strongly in favor (17 percent).
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2013
Support the Israeli position in 
the Middle East conﬂict
Supply weapons to Israel
2014
Response of “1” (Under all circumstances)
Response of “2”
Response of “3”
Response of “4”
Response of “5”
Response of “6” (Under no circumstances)
Figure 2: What should the German government do? (%)
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Scale 1 (“Under all circumstances”)                    6 (“Under no circumstances”). Agreement with the statement: 
“In your opinion, should the German government …?” (Difference from 100% = “don't know, no response”)
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The data also reveal increasing frustration 
and perplexity among the German public. 
Whereas 42 percent of respondents were in 
favor of supporting both sides in 2013, only 
34 percent still held this view in 2014. What 
has increased, however, is the rate of agree-
ment with a comparatively more detached 
and passive position that does not support 
either party in the conflict: 38 percent of 
respondents (up from 32 percent in 2013) 
agreed with the “neither” option.
Whom should the German govern-
ment support?
The data gathered after the Gaza war show 
that only a small number of respondents 
identifies with one of the sides of the con-
flict. These potentials have remained almost 
completely unchanged, with 15 percent of 
respondents saying that the government 
should definitely or probably support Israel 
(compared to 15 percent in 2013) and 7 
percent in favor of support for the Palestini-
ans (compared to 5 percent in 2013). Thus 
political support for the Palestinians has not 
increased even though the images of destruc-
tion in the Gaza Strip published by the media 
have had a potent emotional impact.
Figure 3: Whom should the German government support? (%)
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Deﬁnitely the Palestinians
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Source: TNS Emnid 2013, 2014
Answers to the question: “If you could decide, whom should the German government support in the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict?” 
(Difference from 100% = “neither”; “don’t know, no response”)
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Closure
Confirming the data gathered in 2013, the 
2014 snap survey found that a clear and 
slightly larger majority of 58 percent (com-
pared to 55 percent in 2013) agrees with the 
statement “Almost 70 years after the end of 
the Second World War, we should no longer 
talk so much about the persecution of the 
Jews, but finally put the past behind us.”
Education has a powerful effect on attitudes 
towards this issue. Support for closure de-
creases sharply among those with higher 
qualifications, so that a majority of 55 percent 
of respondents with a high school diploma  
or a university degree rejects the call for  
closure. In contrast, an extraordinarily high 
proportion of 71 percent of respondents  
with lower educational levels (primary 
school or secondary school) is in favor of  
closure, along with a large majority (75 per-
cent) of secondary school students. These 
findings underscore the importance of edu-
cational projects and indicate that teaching 
and remembrance of history must be critically 
examined and reevaluated against the back-
ground of the increasing remoteness of the 
younger generations from the historical  
period in question.
The 2007 study found that there was a 10- 
percent discrepancy between agreement 
rates in western and eastern Germany (60 
percent and 50 percent, respectively). This 
gap has narrowed in the interim, and agree-
ment rates are now 60 percent in the west 
and 56 percent in the east.
2013 2014
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Figure 4: Putting the past behind us (%)
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Answers to the question: “Today, almost 70 years after the end of the Second World War, we should no longer talk so much about the 
persecution of the Jews but ﬁnally put the past behind us.” Do you think this statement is right or wrong? (Difference from 100%: 
“undecided”; “don’t know, no response”)
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anti-Semitism is found more frequently 
among older respondents: 33 percent of  
respondents aged 60 and older agreed with 
this statement compared to only 7 percent  
of those aged under 29. Education too has an 
impact on attitudes to this question in that 
approval decreases as the educational levels 
of respondents rise.
Anti-Semitism in Germany 
The statement that “Jews have too much in-
fluence in the world” is a classical indicator 
of traditional anti-Semitism. Agreement with 
this statement has decreased slightly from 
28 percent in 2013 to 23 percent in 2014 
and almost three-quarters of respondents re-
ject it. The relative consistency of traditional 
anti-Semitism and its stability and resistance 
to change have been confirmed by other stud-
ies as well. Although this anti-Semitism is 
not necessarily expressed on a regular basis, 
it can be activated in times of political crisis. 
The snap survey results show that traditional 
2013
Jews have too much inﬂuence
in the world
2014
Fully agree
Tend to disagree
Tend to agree
Absolutely disagree
Figure 5: Anti-Semitism in Germany (%)
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Agreement with the statements: “Jews have too much inﬂuence in the world”; “What the state of Israel is doing to the Palestinians 
today is essentially the same thing as what the Nazis did to the Jews during the Third Reich.” (Difference from 100%: “don't know”, 
no response”)
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Comparison of Israel’s Palestinian
policies with Nazi crimes
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The findings are somewhat different in the 
case of criticisms of Israel that invoke the 
Nazis’ treatment of the Jews. The statement 
“What the state of Israel is doing to the 
Palestinians today is essentially the same 
thing as what the Nazis did to the Jews du-
ring the Third Reich” serves as an indicator 
for anti-Semitism directed at the state of 
Israel. Approval of this statement remains 
fairly high, although it has dropped from 41 
percent to 34 percent and the agreement rate 
is gradually returning to the levels recorded 
in the 2007 survey. Unlike traditional anti-
Semitism, this form of anti-Semitism has 
above-average support (40 percent) among 
the youngest respondents aged up to 29 
years. Once again, agreement decreases with 
rising levels of education. It should be noted 
once more that approval of this statement 
does not necessarily correlate with constant 
verbalizations of anti-Semitic sentiments, 
but that anti-Semitism directed at Israel can 
be activated by political events in the Middle 
East. Despite a slight drop in the figures, it 
is possible that the frequency of anti-Semitic 
utterances increased significantly in the 
course of the Gaza conflict.
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